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 Abstract 
The insolvency of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the subsequent global liquidity 
crisis spurred the German state to pass the Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz, “FMStFG”) establishing the Federal Agency for 
Financial Market Supervision (Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung), or FMSA. 
Created in October 2008, it provided government support to ailing financial institutions. 
The FMSA supported German banks and maintained the stability of the German banking 
system, in part by establishing the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (Sonderfunds 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung), or SoFFin. SoFFin could provide capital injections and risk 
shield measures of €80 billion and also possessed a guarantee provision of up to €400 
billion. The actual recapitalizations peaked at €29.4 billion in late 2010. Capital injections 
rescued overcapitalized banks and assisted in the government takeover of and 
restructuring of HRE Gruppe. SoFFin was supposed to accept applications until late 2009, 
but this was extended several times until 2010. SoFFin was later reopened in 2012, finally 
closing in 2015. Germany has since passed a Restructuring Act that acts as a framework for 
winding up banks that are “too big to fail,” making systemic risk support operations a 
permanent pillar of German banking regulations. Though this law facilitates the resolution 
of systemically relevant banks, it does not sufficiently clarify interagency coordination, nor 
does it establish a resolution for other systemically important nonbank financial 
institutions. As of the end of 2018, SoFFin has €14.6 billion outstanding from capital 
injections.  
Keywords: Capital injections, Germany, SoFFin 
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 At a Glance  
European liquidity crises and exposure 
to the subprime mortgage market in the 
United States created pressure affecting 
the German banking sector. The failure 
of Lehman created interbank liquidity 
shortages throughout Europe. In a bid to 
restore confidence in the financial 
system, European leaders met on 
October 12, 2008 and decided on a 
comprehensive framework to preserve 
financial stability and support banks. 
Consequently, the German Parliament 
passed the Financial Market Stabilization 
Fund Act 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz, 
“FMStFG”) on October 17, 2008. It 
created a Federal Agency for Financial 
Market Stabilization (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung, “FMSA”), 
which created and administered the new 
Financial Market Stabilization Fund 
(Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung 
“SoFFin”). SoFFin contained provisions 
for guarantees, capital injections, asset 
purchases, and nationalization of 
distressed financial institutions in Germany. 
The recapitalization program was limited to €80 billion, of which a maximum of €29.4 
billion was outstanding at the end of 2010. Solvent financial institutions with Tier 1  capital 
over 7% and meeting Basel II regulatory capital requirements plus 2% were eligible if they 
agreed to limit risk and suspend dividends after recapitalization. 
The European Commission approved SoFFin and its recapitalizations scheme in accordance 
with Article 87 (3)(b) of the EC Treaty, exempting SoFFin from the state aid rules due to 
serious economic disturbances in Germany. As of December 2018, €14.6 billion was 
outstanding in Commerzbank, Hypo Real Estate (since nationalized) and Portigon (former 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: Strengthen the capital base of German 
financial institutions and restore confidence in German 
economy. 
Announcement Date October 12, 2008 
Operational Date October 17, 2008 
End of Issuance 
Window  
Dec. 31, 2009 (initial) 
Dec. 31, 2010 (extended) 
Reopened in 2012 – closed 
Dec. 31, 2015  
Program Size €70 billion with a possible 
extension of €10 billion  
Peak Utilization  €29.4 billion (2010) 
Participants Aareal Bank, Commerzbank, 
Hypo Real Estate, Portigon 
(former WestLB) 
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WestLB) with no clear exit strategy. Applications for recapitalization aid under SoFFin 
were initially due in December 2009, later extended to December 2010. SoFFin was 
reopened in 2012, with a closure date in 2014, but ultimately extended until 2015. 
Summary Evaluation  
SoFFin is generally assessed positively. It was a necessity to maintain financial stability in 
Germany. It bolstered the capital structure of German financial institutions, easing some 
pressure from interbank liquidity shortages, and later, the sovereign debt crisis. It limited 
the vulnerability of German financial institutions to systemic risk. However, critics had 
concerns about the stigma associated with seeking aid, and the extensions of the eligibility 
window as potential issues limiting SoFFin’s effectiveness. 
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Germany Context 2008–2009 
GDP $3.7 trillion in 2008 
$3.4 trillion in 2009 
GDP per capita $45,427 per capita in 2008 
$41,486 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating  
(five-year senior debt) 
 









Size of banking system $4.0 trillion in 2008 
$4.0 trillion in 2009 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
115.2% in 2008 
118.7% in 2009 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of financial system Data not available for given years 
Five-bank concentration of  
banking system 
85.6% in 2008 
85.7% in 2009 
Foreign involvement in  
banking system 
12% in 2008 
12% in 2009 
Government ownership of  
banking system 
35% of banks owned by the state in 
2008 
Existence of deposit insurance Entschädigungseinrichtung 
deutscher Banken 
Source: Bloomberg, Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and Implications”, World 
Bank Global Financial Development Database 
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The financial tensions in Germany stemming from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) were 
exacerbated dramatically in 2008, amidst global turbulence. Germany’s financial market 
was globally integrated and suffered from exposure to the American subprime mortgage 
markets and the subsequent disruptions in international money, interbank lending, and 
capital markets. These created uncertainties in the market with respect to price 
developments, transparency of information, and confidence amongst market participants. 
Market forces were unable to stabilize the financial system and restore confidence in the 
financial market. 
To combat the liquidity crises in Europe, Eurozone countries assembled on October 12, 
2008, and created a comprehensive plan of action to restore the confidence and proper 
functioning of European economies. A crucial part of this plan was “providing financial 
institutions with additional capital resources so as to continue to ensure the proper 
financing of the economy” and “allowing for an efficient recapitalization of distressed 
banks” (Summit of Euro Area Countries 2008). It also involved credit lines and guarantees. 
Germany shortly thereafter passed the Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz “FMStFG”) which established a Federal Agency for 
Financial Market Stabilization (Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung “FMSA”). The 
FMSA administered the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (Sonderfonds 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung “SoFFin”) (FMStFG 2008). In 2008, Commerzbank was 
undercapitalized, and was recapitalized by SoFFin. By 2009, HRE Gruppe, Aareal Bank, and 
Portigon (former WestLB) had also sought recapitalization (FMSA 2019). HRE Gruppe was 
eventually nationalized by SoFFin. 
Program Description 
The Financial Market Stabilization Fund, or SoFFin, was a German federal fund to stabilize 
the financial market, overcoming liquidity shortages and creating the framework 
conditions for a strengthening of the capital base of financial institutions. FMStFG had a 
tripartite strategy for stabilization using SoFFin including guarantees, recapitalization, and 
risk shields. The FMStFG limited total guarantees to €400 billion, and total recapitalization 
and risk shield funds to €80 billion. The objective of this recapitalization scheme was to 
ensure that existing solvent German financial institutions were sufficiently capitalized so 
that they could withstand potential losses and restore confidence in the German economy 
(European Commission 2008a). 
Eligible institutions included a comprehensive list of financial institutions including 
insurance undertakings, pension funds, investment companies, operators of stock and 
futures exchanges and their parent companies, financial holding companies, insurance 
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holding companies, and private-law entrusted owners of Landesbanken (state owned 
regional banks) organized under public law (FMStFG 2008). Each individual institution 
needed to be solvent, with a Tier 1 ratio of at least 7%, or a commitment to reaching this 
ratio within three months. They must also adhere to the requirement of minimum 
regulatory capital in Basel II plus two percentage points (European Commission 2008b). 
Each institution could apply for a maximum of €10 billion of recapitalization aid before the 
deadline of December 31, 2009 (Petrovic and Tutsch 2009).  
The Federal Ministry of Finance could decide on the participation of SoFFin in a 
recapitalization scheme when there was a substantial interest on the part of the Federation 
and the purpose sought by the Federation could not better and more economically be 
achieved by other means. SoFFin could participate in the recapitalization of a financial-
sector enterprise by acquiring shares or silent participations against a contribution and 
assuming other components of the funds of these companies. Institutions receiving capital 
injections from SoFFin had to pay interest at a rate that averaged from 7-9%, unless SoFFin 
recapitalized with significant contributions from the private sector (Petrovic and Tutsch 
2009). The Federal Government could issue ordinances with more detailed provisions of 
the conditions of the recapitalization, upper limits for the participation in own fund items 
of individual organizations as well as particular types of fund items, and any other 
conditions required to safeguard the purpose of the Act under the context of 
recapitalization (FMStFG 2008). 
Financial institutions seeking to utilize one of the stabilization measures in SoFFin had to 
guarantee a sustainable business policy and reduce or abandon any risky activities. 
Recapitalized entities were not allowed to pay dividends unless there existed sufficient 
incentives to repay the State, and compensation for individual management members was 
limited to €500,000 per annum. Bonuses were disallowed while state capital remained in 
use, and dividends were distributable only to the Government. Recapitalized institutions 
were also obligated to provide loans to SMEs (Petrovic and Tutsch 2009). The Federal 
Government was empowered to issue additional requirements to these organizations on 
business strategy, use of monies received, and other conditions surrounding 
recapitalization funds (FMStFG 2008). 
SoFFin was funded through mandated contributions from individual German states and by 
issuing debt securities up to a maximum of €100 billion (Mayer Brown 2009). The Federal 
Ministry of Finance was empowered to issue up to €70 billion of total aid within SoFFin’s 
risk acquisition and recapitalization provisions, with a possible extension of €10 billion 
with the consent of the Budget Committee of the Deutscher Bundestag. Applications for 
SoFFin’s stabilization measures were initially due on December 31, 2009, at which time 
they were no longer accepted, though subsequent policies extended this deadline first to 
2010, then it was reopened in 2012 with a deadline in 2014, and finally extended to 2015 
(European Commission 2010; Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2019). As of December 2018, 
€14.6 billion are outstanding in Commerzbank, Hypo Real Estate (since nationalized) and 
Portigon (former WestLB) (FMSA 2019). There are no clear exit strategies for these 
involvements. 
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Though the European Committee Treaty Article 87(1) disallows State Aid to domestic 
businesses in a manner that affects competition in the EU, the EC approved SoFFin. This 
was justified by EC Treaty Article 87(3)(b), permitting the recapitalizations, guarantees, 
and risk assumptions because of economic disturbances in Germany (European 
Commission 2008a). 
Outcomes 
Of a maximum of €80 billion, actual recapitalizations peaked at €29.4 billion in late 2010 
(International Monetary Fund 2011). Capital injections occurred throughout 2009 and 
2010, much of which were directed to HRE Gruppe, later nationalized. The European 
Commission approved extensions of SoFFin deadlines that made this possible (European 
Commission 2011a). The initial deadline was December 31, 2009, presuming the crisis 
lasted that long, but Germany successfully appealed to have it extended first to June 3, 
2010, and later to December 31, 2010 (European Commission 2010). 
As of December 31, 2018, €14.6 billion remains outstanding from recapitalization under 
SoFFin. Substantial amounts of this funding went to HRE Gruppe, peaking at €9.8 billion in 
late 2011; Commerzbank, peaking at €18.2 billion in late 2010; Portigon (former WestLB) 
peaking at €3 billion in December 2010; and Aareal Bank, peaking at €500 million in 2009 
(FMSA 2019). Aareal Bank has repaid SoFFin’s contributions while Commerzbank has €5.1 
billion outstanding, HRE Gruppe has €7.6 billion outstanding, and Portigon has €2 billion 
outstanding.  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The SoFFin capital injections scheme was introduced as part of a package in 
FMStFG, which also included guarantee and risk-shield provisions. 
The German government passed the Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz “FMStFG”), a package of crisis response measures 
that created the Financial Market Stabilization Agency (FMSA). FMSA was responsible for 
managing the fund in SoFFin. FMStFG also established SoFFin, which was to be used for 
three financial stability strategies: capital injections, guarantees, and risk shields (FMStFG 
2008). Section 7 of the FMStFG authorized the recapitalization scheme in particular. 
Borrowing by the fund was financed by issuing debt up to a maximum of €100 billion 
(European Commission 2008a). 
2. The Fund has no legal capacity. The legal basis of the recapitalization scheme 
was the passage of FMStFG, the act which created SoFFin. 
The Deutsche Bundesbank is responsible for the general jurisdiction of the Fund, which 
may act, sue, and be sued in its own name. No other measures of compulsory execution 
against the Fund may be attached (FMStFG 2008). 
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3. The European Commission approved the SoFFin capital injections scheme under 
Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty. 
The European Commission bans “state aid,” or government interventions that privilege a 
specific company, industry, or region in a way that distorts trade or competition. Capital 
injections would normally be considered such a privilege (European Commission 2019). 
However, the European Commission (EC) permitted capital injections from SoFFin due to 
Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, which permits state aid to “remedy a serious disturbance 
in the economy of a Member State” (European Commission 2008a). 
4. SoFFin and its capital injections schemes were managed by the FMSA, initially 
under the purview of the Bundesbank, but later assigned to the Federal Ministry 
of Finance in July 2009.  
The Federal Ministry of Finance controls FMSA, a public-law federal agency. It is managed 
by a three-member Management Committee appointed by the Ministry of Finance in 
consultation with the Bundesbank. An inter-ministerial Steering Committee decides on 
agency proposals, though the Federal Ministry of Finance is responsible for the actual 
administration of the Fund. The Steering Committee is composed of one member each from 
the Federal Chancellery, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economics and 
Technology, and one member proposed by the Lӓnder. The Federal Government has the 
capacity to create guidelines that govern administration of the SoFFin fund, and does not 
required consent of the Bundesrat to do so (FMStFG 2008). As of January 1, 2018, SoFFin 
has been managed by the Federal Ministry of Finance, which has been funding it since its 
inception in 2008 (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2019).  
5. Total funding for SoFFin and its capital injections and risk-shield strategies, was 
capped at €80 billion.  
The Federal Ministry of Finance could take loans of up to €70 billion in order to fund 
SoFFin and the three strategies for which it is responsible. There was a possible extension 
of 10 billion additional Euros with the consent of the Budget Committee of the Deutscher 
Bundestag. Each individual institution was eligible for a maximum of €10 billion of 
recapitalization funds prior to the deadline of December 31, 2009 (FMStFG 2008). 
6. Eligible institutions for capital injections under SoFFin included banks and 
nonbank institutions listed here. 
The Federal Ministry of Finance would decide on the participation of SoFFin in a 
recapitalization scheme when there was a substantial interest on the part of the Federation 
and the purpose sought by the Federation could not better and more economically be 
achieved by other means (FMStFG 2008). The institutions receiving recapitalization aid 
from SoFFin were Aareal Bank, Commerzbank, Hypo Real Estate Gruppe (HRE), and 
Portigon (former West Landesbank). 
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SoFFin was meant to strengthen the capital base of institutions under section 1(1b) of the 
Banking Act, of insurance undertakings and pension funds under section 1(1) numbers 1 
and 2 of the Insurance Supervision Act, of investment companies under the Investment Act, 
as well as of the operators of stock and futures exchanges and their respective parent 
enterprises, insofar as these financial holding companies, mixed financial holding 
companies, insurance holding companies or mixed insurance holding companies, and the 
abovementioned enterprises have their seat in Germany (financial-sector enterprises). 
Private-law-entrusted owners of Landesbanken organized under public law, even where 
the owners are not financial holding companies, were also considered to be financial-sector 
enterprises within the meaning of the first sentence above (FMStFG 2008).  
These institutions needed to have a Tier 1 ratio of at least 7%, which was the threshold for 
solvency. If they did not meet this criterion, they were still eligible to apply for capital 
injections under SoFFin if they committed to reaching it within three months. This is in 
contrast to the Basel II Tier 1 ratio requirement of 4% of risk-weighted assets (Basel 2004). 
There was also a requirement to hold minimum regulatory capital under Basel II (8%) plus 
two percentage points (European Commission 2008b). This requirement indicates that 
SoFFin’s provision to inject capital was targeted towards solvent financial institutions in 
order to strengthen their capital base so that they could better withstand potential losses 
caused by liquidity crises in Europe and exposure to the U.S. housing market. It was also an 
attempt to restore confidence in the German economy (European Commission 2008a). 
7. SoFFin could participate in the recapitalization of a financial-sector enterprise 
by acquiring shares or silent participations against a contribution and assuming 
other components of the funds of these companies. SoFFin then became the 
shareholder of acquisitions from capital injections. 
Capital injections to Commerzbank were announced on December 19, 2008. SoFFin made a 
silent participation of €8.2 billion in one tranche as of December 31, 2008, with annual 
interest of 9% paid on the silent participation (Commerzbank 2008a). Silent participation 
aid did not dilute shareholder control and gave the Federal Republic no direct influence on 
the operations of a bank (Mitchell 2016). In case of insolvency and liquidation, the debt was 
subordinate to all existing debt, pari passu with future hybrid offerings, and senior to 
shareholders. The silent participation is perpetual and could be terminated by 
Commerzbank with approval from the Ministry of Finance. It would be redeemed at 
nominal value (Commerzbank 2008b). There would not be a dividend for the first year, but 
in years with dividend payments, the interest rate applicable for the silent participation 
would increase. For each €4.4 million of dividend, one basis point would be added 
(Commerzbank 2008a). The first €4.1 billion of the contribution had an interest rate of 
8.5% and the second €4.1 billion had an interest rate of 5.5% (Levitin 2008). To avoid legal 
limits on state aid to individual banks, Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank separately sought 
additional aid in early 2009, prior to Commerzbank’s planned acquisition of Dresdner 
Bank. The state refused this request, but eventually acquiesced to a €10 billion 
contribution to Commerzbank after threats of abandoning the merger. Dresdner Bank was 
struggling due to its real estate investments and would have otherwise required 
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nationalization to save it, which the German state sought to avoid. Of the €10 billion the 
state contributed, €8.2 billion was an additional silent participation, but €1.8 billion 
consisted of ordinary shares amounting to a 25% stake (Clark 2011).This was the first time 
SoFFin had taken a direct position in a financial institution, and its contributions secured it 
veto power over decisions at Commerzbank. It also received three seats on the bank board, 
though it did not intend to influence any decision-making, or dilute ownership control by 
private shareholders (Mitchell 2016). Commerzbank had nine members on its board in 
2009 (Commerzbank 2009). 
Aareal Bank had sufficient cash and capital base throughout the 2009 financial year, and 
sought SoFFin support to strengthen it against further turbulence in financial markets. 
SoFFin injections to Aareal bank in 2009 amounted to €525 million with 9% annual 
interest (Aareal 2009b). To expedite the repayment of the silent participation, Aareal bank 
did not issue dividends in 2008 or 2009 (Aareal 2009a). 
In 2009, WestLB, a major Landesbank with €288.1 Billion of assets at year-end 2008, was 
large enough to be considered a systemic risk (European Commission 2009b). Its exposure 
to American subprime assets was a problem first realized in losses of €2.5 billion on its 
subprime portfolio (Mitchell 2016). In November 2009, shareholders along with the 
German government agreed to establish a bad bank, Erste Abwicklungsanstalt. It took over 
a portfolio of risk positions and risky assets that would have otherwise negatively impacted 
the performance of WestLB. The capital injection from SoFFin to WestLB amounted to €3 
billion in three installments. First, €672 million was injected on December 23, 2009; €1.5 
billion was injected on January 4, 2010; and €828 million was injected on April 30, 2010. 
The capital injection was in the form of a non-callable silent participation, which was 
optionally convertible into ordinary shares after July 1, 2010 (European Commission 
2011b). The terms dictated that SoFFin cannot become a majority shareholder of the 
company. If WestLB showed a sufficient year-end profit, the terms of the silent 
participation provided for a 10% remuneration per annum. In the case of loss, the silent 
participation would participate pari passu in the losses and forgo remuneration.  
Hypo Real Estate (HRE) was nationalized by SoFFin. A credit line was extended to it in 
2008, and SoFFin subsequently made a public takeover bid to acquire all shares in HRE. 
Though SoFFin could have nationalized HRE by law had its bid been unsuccessful, it 
acquired 38.65% of shares in the bid. This gave SoFFin 47.31% stake in HRE, and due to 
low shareholder attendance in the general assembly, SoFFin had de facto control of HRE 
(European Commission 2009a). In April 2009, SoFFin submitted an offer to HRE 
shareholders to purchase shares at €1.39 per share: 
 The Management Board and Supervisory Board of Hypo Real Estate Holding AG have 
resolved to propose an increase of the registered share capital against cash 
contributions, excluding shareholders’ pre-emptive subscription rights, pursuant to 
sections 182 et seq. AktG in conjunction with section 7 FMStFG, to an Extraordinary 
General Meeting on June 2, 2009. To strengthen the Company’s capital base in a 
sustained manner, it is proposed to increase the Company’s registered share capital 
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(Grundkapital) of € 693,253,560 by cash contributions of up to € 5,639,282,040 to a 
total of up to € 6,332,535,600, through the issuance of up to 1,879,760,680 new no-par 
value bearer shares. (Hypo Real Estate 2009) 
 SoFFin would subscribe new shares at the lowest price to obtain a 90% stake in the 
company. SoFFin intended to increase HRE equity from €700 million to around €6.3 
billion, diluting the stake of existing shareholders (DW 2009). In October of 2009, SoFFin 
squeezed out remaining minority shareholders by forcing an offer of €1.30 a share, fully 
nationalizing HRE. Minority shareholder firm JC Flowers, along with other shareholders, 
took legal action against the full nationalization of HRE Gruppe, and filed a complaint with 
the European Union (Reuters 2009). However, the complainants lost this challenge, and the 
2011 decision of the Munich courts was that Germany had a legal basis for the forced 
nationalization of HRE Gruppe (Wilson 2011). 
As of December 2018, €14.6 billion are outstanding in Commerzbank, Hypo Real Estate 
(since nationalized) and Portigon (former WestLB) (FMSA 2019). SoFFin has no clear exit 
strategy for these involvements. 
8. The Federal Government could issue ordinances with more detailed provisions 
of the conditions of the recapitalization. 
These included the consideration of the recapitalization, upper limits for the participation 
in own-fund items of individual organizations as well as particular types of fund items, the 
conditions under which the Fund could resell its participation in the own-fund items, and 
any other conditions required to safeguard the purpose of the Act under the context of 
recapitalization (FMStFG 2008). Financial enterprises seeking to utilize one of the 
stabilization measures in SoFFin had to guarantee a prudent business policy. (Petrovic and 
Tutsch 2009) 
Each applicant to the recapitalization measure in SoFFin had to prove that their business 
activities were sustainable and that their risky activities were limited or abandoned. They 
were obligated to provide loans to SMEs. They were not allowed to pay dividends to any 
shareholders before the State, and individuals managing each firm were limited to 
€500,000 in annual compensation. They were not allowed to receive bonuses. (Petrovic 
and Tutsch 2009) 
The Federal Government was empowered to issue additional requirements to these 
organizations on business strategy, use of monies received, remuneration of their bodies 
and employees, the level of their own funds, distribution of dividends, the period within 
which to fulfill requirements, measures to avoid distortions of competition, the way in 
which account was to be rendered to the Fund, an undertaking on compliance with the 
above enumerated requirements to be given by the authorized representative body with 
the consent of the supervisory body and to be published, and any other conditions required 
to safeguard the purpose of the FMStFG (FMStFG 2008).  
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9. SoFFin’s stabilization measures were initially available until December 31, 2009, 
but were subject to several extensions. 
The initial deadline for applications for recapitalization funds was December 31, 2009, 
provided the crisis lasted that long (European Commission 2008b). However, with 
approval from the European Commission, Germany successfully appealed to have the 
deadline extended three times to December 31, 2010. SoFFin was reopened in 2012 with a 
final closure in 2015 (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2019; European Commission 2010).  
10.  There are no clear exit strategies for SoFFin’s recapitalization involvement.  
As of December 2018, €14.6 billion were outstanding in Commerzbank, Hypo Real Estate 
(since nationalized) and Portigon (former WestLB). SoFFin has announced no clear plans to 
exit these capital injections, nor does FMStFG delineate clear exit strategies. 
11.  Germany has new legislation concerning government interventions in the case 
of financial crisis.  
Germany passed the Bank Restructuring Act in January 2011. This act strengthened the 
coordination of various German federal agencies and European agencies in order to better 
deal with distressed systemically important banks. It creates procedures to recover 
struggling banks and reorganize insolvent ones by the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin), the successor to FMSA. These measures will be funded by a 
Restructuring Fund to which all banks are required to contribute (Deutsche Bundesbank 
2011). 
III. Evaluation 
Assessments of SoFFin’s overall effectiveness are generally positive in nature and agree 
that it contributed to maintaining financial stability and limiting losses in Germany during 
the global financial crisis. It also created mechanisms for resolving problem banks with 
better interagency coordination and strengthened the broader crisis management 
framework in Germany. SoFFin created mechanisms to combat short term issues of 
liquidity and confidence, but also helped achieve some long-term goals like encouraging 
executive responsibility by restricting compensation while using SoFFin funds. However, it 
did not adequately address the issues of lack of transparency regarding bank assets and 
performance. In addition, it did not address long-term issues of bank concentration or 
executive liabilities for losses (Bleuel 2009). SoFFin also did not have a clear exit strategy, 
and this is particularly an issue for the recapitalization funds of which €14.6 billion remain 
outstanding. In addition, the relationship between SoFFin’s restructuring fund and the 
deposit insurance schemes and mutual protection schemes must be clarified. (International 
Monetary Fund 2011) SoFFin was not constructed to coordinate with other European and 
German institutions to comprehensively address failing banks. Germany has since passed a 
Restructuring Act that finances its recapitalization fund by collecting dues from 
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systemically important banks. This Act also contains provisions to recover and restructure 
illiquid or insolvent banks in coordination with other German and European agencies, 
especially if the bank operates across borders (Deutsche Bundesbank 2011). 
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